Testnet only. Sei Atlantic-2, chain 1328.Not audited. Test funds only.

Security

Threat model

Who can do what to your money and your privacy, stated plainly.

On this page
  1. Who can do what
  2. The website is part of your trust base
  3. What the app does to narrow risks
  4. Not covered

Batin's guarantees hold only if three things hold: the proof system is sound, the trusted setup was honest, and your phone isn't compromised. On testnet, the second is not guaranteed (see Trusted setup).

Who can do what

Party Can Cannot
Anyone watching Sei See every deposit and withdrawal in full; see that private transactions happen and when; see which root a proof used See the amount, asset, sender or recipient of a private transfer or claim
The sender of a link Take the money back until the claim lands Take it back after it lands
Anyone who reads a link Claim it before the intended recipient does Learn anything about the sender's other notes
Anyone who reads a payment request Pay that address, and see the address, amount and note written into the link Spend the recipient's notes, or see their balance
The relayer / sponsor Refuse or delay; see your IP address, timing, and withdrawal recipients Redirect funds, change outputs, take a fee from a private transfer
The ASP poster Refuse to approve a deposit Move funds, change outputs, block a refund
The setup operator (testnet) Forge proofs and drain the pool Read anyone's notes
Circle Freeze all USDC held by the vault Touch SEI
This website Serve you modified JavaScript that steals your seed Reach your seed if you never load a modified build
Malware on your unlocked phone Spend everything Spend without the seed being unlocked

There is no owner key. The pool has no admin, pause, upgrade or fee switch. An upgrade key would be a drain key, so none exists.

The website is part of your trust base

A web wallet runs code that the server sends each time you open it. Whoever controls the deployment could ship a version that sends your seed elsewhere. On testnet that's an accepted risk. Before real value, the app needs reproducible builds, published hashes, and ideally a native or pinned distribution.

What the app does to narrow risks

  • The seed is sealed at rest (passkey PRF, or passphrase-scrypt) and the app locks after 10 minutes in the background.
  • Before any output is sent, the app decrypts its own ciphertext and recomputes the commitment (Spec §8.2), so a bug can't strand funds in an unreadable note.
  • Payment link secrets live only in the URL fragment and are removed from the address bar as soon as the page reads them.
  • The relayer simulates every transaction and refuses spent or unknown-root proofs, so it doesn't pay for reverts.
  • Refunds can be sent only by the depositor, and nobody can stop them.

Not covered

Network-level anonymity (use a VPN or Tor if your IP matters), compromised operating systems, coercion, and correlation from your own behaviour (see Privacy limits).

Source: apps/web/content/docs/threat-model.md