Security
Threat model
On this page
Batin's guarantees hold only if three things hold: the proof system is sound, the trusted setup was honest, and your phone isn't compromised. On testnet, the second is not guaranteed (see Trusted setup).
Who can do what
| Party | Can | Cannot |
|---|---|---|
| Anyone watching Sei | See every deposit and withdrawal in full; see that private transactions happen and when; see which root a proof used | See the amount, asset, sender or recipient of a private transfer or claim |
| The sender of a link | Take the money back until the claim lands | Take it back after it lands |
| Anyone who reads a link | Claim it before the intended recipient does | Learn anything about the sender's other notes |
| Anyone who reads a payment request | Pay that address, and see the address, amount and note written into the link | Spend the recipient's notes, or see their balance |
| The relayer / sponsor | Refuse or delay; see your IP address, timing, and withdrawal recipients | Redirect funds, change outputs, take a fee from a private transfer |
| The ASP poster | Refuse to approve a deposit | Move funds, change outputs, block a refund |
| The setup operator (testnet) | Forge proofs and drain the pool | Read anyone's notes |
| Circle | Freeze all USDC held by the vault | Touch SEI |
| This website | Serve you modified JavaScript that steals your seed | Reach your seed if you never load a modified build |
| Malware on your unlocked phone | Spend everything | Spend without the seed being unlocked |
There is no owner key. The pool has no admin, pause, upgrade or fee switch. An upgrade key would be a drain key, so none exists.
The website is part of your trust base
A web wallet runs code that the server sends each time you open it. Whoever controls the deployment could ship a version that sends your seed elsewhere. On testnet that's an accepted risk. Before real value, the app needs reproducible builds, published hashes, and ideally a native or pinned distribution.
What the app does to narrow risks
- The seed is sealed at rest (passkey PRF, or passphrase-scrypt) and the app locks after 10 minutes in the background.
- Before any output is sent, the app decrypts its own ciphertext and recomputes the commitment (Spec §8.2), so a bug can't strand funds in an unreadable note.
- Payment link secrets live only in the URL fragment and are removed from the address bar as soon as the page reads them.
- The relayer simulates every transaction and refuses spent or unknown-root proofs, so it doesn't pay for reverts.
- Refunds can be sent only by the depositor, and nobody can stop them.
Not covered
Network-level anonymity (use a VPN or Tor if your IP matters), compromised operating systems, coercion, and correlation from your own behaviour (see Privacy limits).
Source: apps/web/content/docs/threat-model.md